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from complying with the subpoena and against the Senators on the 
Sub-Committee and the Sub-Committee counsel restraining them 
from seeking to enforce ·the subpoenas by contempt of Congress or 
any other means. The USDC denied the TRO on the grounds of lack 
of standing and a failure of subject matter jurisdiction. The 
CA reversed with MacKinnon dissenting. After a hearing, the 
USDC (Gasch) denied a preliminary injunction but the CA over 
dissent stayed enforcement of the subpoena. At the hearing on 
the merits, the USDC denied a permanent injunction, dismissed ----
the Senators as parties defendant, and denied an order compelling 
the testimony of the Sub-Committee's chief counsel as to certain 
--------~------------~---------------------------
ex~a-~e~d m~tt~rs. (The Senate inS. Res. 478, 9lst Cong., 
2d Sess. had prohibited the counsel from testifying about any 
matters not of public record.) 
On appeal of this decision, theCA consolidated the USSF 
case w~th three related cases involving subpoenas of the House 
Committee on Internal Security relating to bank records of the 
. C) 
Progressive Labor Party (PLP), National Peace Coalitjon (NPC), 
~ 
and t People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). 
-----------------------------------------------
Discussing only the facts in the USSF case, Judges Tuttle and 
Bazelon reversed the decision below over Judge MacKinnon's 
dissent. The majority held that in the instant case the 
---------------------------------------
organizatjons could vindicate their rights only through direct 
injunctive relief, that the court had subject matter jurisdiction, ----------
-3-
that the organizations had standing to contest the third party 
subpoena because they alleged a violation of their First Amendme nt 
rights, that the case was not a political question, that the 
Senators were not immune from an injunction against issuance and 
~~ ------------------------
service as opposed to authorization of a subpoena as this was not 
within the Speech and Debate Clause nor a legislative act, that 
the subpoena wa~ illegal as causing irreparable damage to freedom 
---------------------
of association (reversing the balancing test based on Barenblatt 
~
applied in USDC), and that the USDC on remand should consider 
taking testimony from the Sub-Committee counsel and that an actual 
injunction should issue against the Senators only if declaratory 
relief would not suffice. The dissent would have held the 
subpoenas proper under Barenblatt and Uphaus, that the case 
presented a political question, and that the Senators were immune 
as acting within the legislative sphere under Doe v. McMillan. 
The CA denied en bane a motion for rehearing en bane with 
Judges Tamm, MacKinnon, and Wilkey dissenting and Judge Robb -- -----' . 
not participating. Petrs, Senators Eastland, McClellan, Ervjn, 
Bayh, Thurmond, and Cook and the Senate Sub-Committee Counsel, 
-.. . ,.......__ -----
seek cert renewing their arguments below. There is as yet no 
I 
petition from the House Committee wjth regard to its subpoenas. 
~ Resps argue that the Senate subpoena is 4 years 
old and that the questions presented in the immediate case are 




investigation. Although the petition does not directly respond 
to this argument, it appears frivolous inasmuch as the Senate 
resolution authorizing the investigation remains in effect and 
the on-going U tigation in the immediate case is evidence of the 
Sub-Committee's intent to investigate USSF. 
Facts : USSF is a non-profit tax exempt organization whose 
---:-
primary activities include the setting up of coffee houses and 
I. q 
1 . b . 'I d h ld f . 1 . 1 d h 1 . 1 rar1es aroun t e war or m1 1tary personne an t e supp 1ng 
o f l egal counsel to military personnel in order to aid them in 
escaping their "repressive environment" anri to promote the peace --.... 
movement generally through activities with u.s. military personnel. 
Senate Resolution 341 (9lst Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 
34 17-3418) authorized the Sub-CoiTmittee to make a continuing 
i nvestigation of the administration of the Internal Security Act 
o f 1950 and subversive activities in the U.S. under the control 
o f foreign governments or organizations. Pursuant to this power, 
the Sub-Committee in 1970 adopted a resolution stating that USSF 
should be the subject of further investigation based on the 
evidence gathered concerning it and the subpoena was issued under 
t his resolution. The apparent purpose of the subpoena was to 
l earn whether USSF was receiving foreign funding. 
Contentions: (1) The petrs argue that anticipatory reljef 
o f the type granted in the instant case violates the prjnciple 
o f separation of powers lcf. Hutche·son v . United States, 369 U.S. 
-5-
599, 622] and will cripple the use of congressional process through 
---------
allowing a judicial challenge without risk of contempt. They argue 
that the CA justification of this as the only possible remedy where 
the records are in the hands of a third party is not rational ]n 
light of Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 and Couch v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 322 holding that there is only a permissive 
and not a manditory right to intervene in the case of third party 
subpoenas. They argue that the instant decision const]tutes a 
gross abuse of judicial power based on an ill defined consti-
tutional allegation and constitutes the first jnstance of 
in j unctive relief against Congress itself. 
Resps argue that the instant case like United States v. 
Nixon is one of the small class of cases fitting within the 
exception in Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918) allowing 
review of a subpoena prior to contempt because review afterwards 
wo uld be impossible. The CA majority while recognizing that 
such an anticipatory remedy was extraordinary and unprecedented 
held it justified in the immediate case by the total absence 
o f any alternate means to vindicate resps' rights. 
( 2) Petrs argue that they are immune from suit to enjoin 
t hem from the issuance or enforcement of the]r subpoena by 
? 
(7 
reason of the Speech and Debate Clause which immunizes them in the 
p erformance of such legislative action. The issuance and serv1ng 
o f the subpoena are " things generally done in a session of the 
-6-
House by one of its members in relation to the business before .it" 
[Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 quoted in Doe v. McMillan, 
412 u.s. 306, 311] and unlike the arrest in Kilbourn are not beyond 
the apparent needs of the due functioning of the legislative process. 
Doe, supra at 311. Unlike other cases allowing suits against 
legislators, relief here can not be afforded "without proof of a 
legislative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an act .. " 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621. The result of the CA 
action is that whenever a congressional subpoena is issued, 
Congressmen will have to come into court to defend their action. 
Cf. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82. 
The resps rely on language from Gravel, supra at 621 to show 
the absence of i~munity and reason generally that immunity from suit 
is not really involved in the instant case -- merely the timing of 
review of congressional subpoenas with anticipatory relief justified 
here by the impossibility of post-contempt review and the evasion 
of a judicial test through the third party subpoena. The c 
analogizing the instant case to Doe, supra concluded that while 
the authorization of an unconstitutional subpoena is within the 
legislative sphere and hence immune, the service of such a 
subpoena is not. 
(3) Finally, the petrs argue that the subpoena was not violative 
of First Amendment rights. They point out that the CA djd not find 
an illicit motive behind their actions, that foreign funding of a 
---- I 
~x-exempt organization devoted to promulgating opposjtion to U.S. 
/ foreign policy among military personnel abroad during a foreign 
war is directly relevant to a number of legitimate legislative 
objectives, that the records sought belong to the bank and not the 
USSF [cf. California Bankers Assn v. Schultz, u.s. (dec:i ded 
April 1, 1974); Donaldson, supra at 537 (Douglas, J concurring)], 
and that such commercial finand al records sought for legitimate 
legislative inquiry are not like the membership lists in Pmvell 
or other cases sought for illicit purposes. Both USDC judges 
( 
and the CA dissenter, balancing under Barenblatt v. United States, 
.. ~ ;;::> -
360 U.S. 109 (1959), found that the need for the information 
outweighed any effect on free association. 
TheCA majority held that the subpoena would act to chill First 
Amendment rights of free association in a controversial political 
organization (relying on the NAACP v. Alabama cases) particularly 
through deterring potential donors. It concluded that the subpoena 
was unconstitutional. Resps generally repeat the reasoning of the 
CA relying particularly on Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigat-
ing Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1962). 




to renew here other arguments made below such 
as lack of standing in resps to challenge a third party subpoena 
and characterization of the case as a political question. If 
they do, they have not lucidly stated them in their brief. 
-8-
Resps below raised a question as to whether the subpoena was 
defective because of a lack of specificity and failure of nexus 
with the original resolution on which the CA expressly reserved 
judgement. 
Discussion: The case is obviously certworthy. Unless 
Barenblatt is negated by Gibson, the decision below was error to 
the extent that it failed to consider the substantjal governmental 
interests asserted by petrs but merely found an encroachment of 
freedom of association and concluded that the subpoena was there-
, \fore unconstituttonal. If Gibson does govern, and the bank records 
. a:: t~ s~me as NAACP membership lists, it may be argued that the 
error if any was harmless since the government could not possibly 
meet Gjbson's requireme nt of a "compelling jnterest". 
The extremely narrow reading of congressional immunity under 
the Speech and Debate Clause achieved by distinguishing between 
• 
authorization of subpoenas (within the legislative sphere) and 
servtng subpoenas (outside the legislative sphere) is an artificial 
and dubious one. 
Finally, the case answers the question expressly left open 
in Powell v. McCormack and holds that coercive injunctive relief 
may be applied against members of Congress although only after 
they have failed to heed declaratory relief. 
The decision below is an extraordinary one with unanswered 
legal issues of significance meriting review by this Court. 
There is a response. 




MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
Ron Carr 
No. 73-1923 Eastland, et al. v. United States 
Servicemen's Fund, et al. 
I reconnnend that you vote to reverse, on either of 
two grounds: ~irsti)that there was no proper party defendant, and 
econd if that ground is rejected, that the subpoena's incidental 
~ ~K.be rs t he i ,-
consequences on respondent's j exercise of 4-E-B- First Amendment 
associational rights are outweighed by the Connnittee's need for 
the information in performing its legitimate legislative functions. 
1. The problem arises because of the peculiar problems 
posed by third-party subpoenas, particularly when directed to 
banks. Respondent itself possesses copies of the information ......._____ 
subpoenaed here. If the Connnittee had subpoenaed respondent, 
respondent could have refused to comply. The Connnittee could 
then have voted a contempt revolution, which, if approved by 
the Senate, would have been referred to the Justice Department 
for prosecution. If Justice decided to prosecute, respondent 
could have defended on the ground that the subpoena violated the 
First Amendment. 
But the subpoena was directed to the bank. There is, 
apparently) no recognized bank-depositor privilege. Hence, the 
bank has no incentive to refuse to comply and thus risk a contempt 
2. 
prosecution. Respondent, therefore, has no recourse but to 
attempt to prevent the bank's compliance; otherwise the alleged 
violation of its associational rights cannot be vindicated. 
Petitioners raise here only obliquely two arguments 
vigorously pressed below - that the district court was without 
jur isdiction, and that the case is non-justiciable. I think 
it clear that there was subject-matter jurisdiction under 
1331. Nor is the case non-justiciable. Justiciability depends 
on the nature of the question on the merits. First, even 
assuming that respondent would not have standing to raise a 
Fourth Amendment claim, having no possessory interest in the 
bank's records, it does have standing to assert its associational 
rights. Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, aff'd without opinion, 
393 U.S. 14 (1968). Second, the First Amendment issue is in no 
sense a political question; exactly that sort of question may 
be, and has been, resolved by courts in congressional contempt 
suits. 
2. This Court has often stated that the Speech and 
Debate Clause protects not only against legal liability (e.~., 
in damages) but also against even having to defend against 
suits contesting actions taken within the ambit of the Clause's 
-----------------------
protection. From this it follows that application of the 
Clause cannot depend on whether the action was or was not 
constitutional. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367. 
From this it follows that whether the subpoena here violates . r1 
respondent's First Amendment rights is irrelevant to the quest~on )\ 
3. 
whether the Senators or the Connnittee Counsel are innnune from 
suit. 
In this Court' Speech and Debate irrrrn:unity cases -
Kilbourn, Powell, Gravel, and Doe v. McMillan - the distinction 
is drawn between legislative functions, which are innnune, and 
non-legislative functions, which are not. Thus, in Kilbourn, 
the legislators who voted the arrest were innnune; the sergeant-
at-arms making the arrest was not. In Powell, the legislators 
who voted the exclusion were irrrrn:une; the doorkeeper and 
sergeant-at-arms, who refused to pay Powell and physically 
barred him from the House, were not. In Gravel, the Court made 
clear that the distinction was not between the legislators 
themselves and their employees. On the contrary, if an 
aide did something that, if done by the legislator himself, 
would have been "legislative" and hence innnune, the irrrrn:unity 
also attackCSto the aide. This analysis was followed in 
MacMillan. 
The majority opinion below purports to follow this 
analysis. It holds that authorizing the subpoena is legislative 
-------and innnune; e issuing and serving the subpoena is not. App. 
at 68. Under Kilbourn and the other cases, this distinction 
makes some sense. The court remanded the case on this point, 
on the ground that the record was insufficient to determine 
whether and as to which of the defendants irrrrn:unity would attach. 
App. at 89-80. 
4. 
The problem with this analysis, however, (assuming 
it is otherwise valid) is that when this suit was brought, 
the subpoena had already~e.:-issued and served. Hence an ~ 
~~injunction was sought, not against issuance and service, V> ~ 
but against enforcement of the subpoena. But enforceme~
~/ 
~~--~<A-"'-._ 
accomplished by resolution of the Cormnittee and then of the _ cl!_,1~ 
I should think, is clearly a legislative act. It is 
Senate. In short, the question here is not whether the 0L~~~ 
marshal or other functionary can be enjoined from serving ~ 
the subpoena, but whether, once the subpoena is served, the 
Committee and its counsel can be enjoined from enforcement. 
I would hold that they cannot, enforcement being a legislative 
act. 
If this is so, respondent would appear to be without 
remedy. They ask for an injunction against enforcement by 
the Cormnittee and its counsel and against compliance by the 
bank. The suit against the bank is derivative from that 
against the Committee; only the Government can violate First 
Amendment associational rights. I think that a creative lawyer 
might be able to devise an independent cause of action against 
a bank. For example, one could conceive of a state action 
against the bank on privacy grounds for complying with an 
allegedly invalid subpoena; the bank could defend on the 
ground of the subpoena's validity, and remove to the federal court, 
5. 
whereupon the Conrrnittee could intervene. Or perhaps a 
federal right of action could be implied (with difficulty) 
from the Bank Privacy Act. But the claim against the bank 
here was entirely dependent on the claim against the Conrrnittee. 
3. If you decide that the Conrrnittee members and 
counsel are not inrrnune = either because issuance and service are 
non-legislative and are still in the case, or because 
enforcement is non-legislative, I reconrrnend that you vote to 
hold that the subpoena here did not violate respond~nt's 
associational rights. Most of the association cases 
respondent and the court below cite are distinguishable on 
the ground that, in those cases, there was no clear connection 
between the material sought and a legitimate, articulated 
state need. Here, I think it obvious that the contrary is 
the case. The financial records were clearly and directly ~ 
relevant to the Committee's legitimate investigative and 
legislative purposes. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
700 (1972). There is language in Gibson v. Legislative 
Investigative Conrrn., 372 U.S. 539, arguably to the effect that 
the state's interest must be compelling. If this is the 
standard, then I would hold it satisfied here. But I don't 
think it is the correct standard. There is here no direct 
attempt to infringe on associational rights. Instead, the ---------
infringement, if any, is incidental to the Conrrnittee's 
- - -=:::::::::::-
attempt to perform functions clearl within the scope of its 
6. 
legislative duties. In such cases, a majority of this 
Court has consistently held that the First Amendment question 
must be decided by balancing the consequences on associational 
interests against the reasons and need for the Government 
action. I would hold that the subpoena here passes this test. 
I have expressed my views in this case at greater 
length than you directed for two reasons. First, the 
case is novel and of substantial importance. Second, I am 
somewhat disturbed b my own conclus~on that respondent has 
no remedy. Of course, that remedy would not do respondent 
much good if, as I think, there is no .First Amendment 
violation. But I find it quite di sturbing that a person 
whose bank records are subpoenaed has no way of having 
the First Amendment question adjudicated. There is, I 
think, some legitimate expectation of privacy with respect 
to ones dealings with a bank, as you stated in California ~ ....---____ _____ _
Bankers, 416 u.s. at 78-79. But I see no way of protecting 
that interest in a suit against a congressional committee 
and counsel to bar enforcement that is consistent with this 
Court's previous Speech and Debate cases. 
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r Circulated: APR 4 1975 
f; I tf - 1/lii? ~ Recir culat ed: 
~· ~ ~tDRAFT 
~ ~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~d--~1r-1 ~ 
p-.J- ~ James 0. Eastland et al., 
No. 73-1923 
{/- - Petitioners, 
...,;-- v. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, ~ ~ United States Servicemen's d , - - Fund et al. 
-~ [April -, 1975] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal 
court may_enjoin the~nce or implementation by 
Congress of a subpoena duces te,cum that directs a bank 
to produce -t:ri;b'an'k- records of' an organizat ion which 
claims a First Amendment privilege status for those 
records on the ground that they are the equivalent of 
confidential membership lists. The Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that compli-
ance with the subpoena "would invade the constitutional 
rights" of the organization, and tha.t judicial relief is 
available to prevent implementation of the subpoena. 
I 
/l..sL-~ I::>_ ln early 1970 the Senate Subcommittee on Internal 
A _ /) _ . __ Security was given broad authority by the Senate to 
~·· "make a complete and continuing study and investiga~ 
tioll of .. . the administrat1011, operation and enforce-
ment of the Internal Security Act of 1950 .... " S. Res. 
341, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 3419 (Janu-





2 EASTLAND v. UNITED STATES SEIWICEMEN'S FUND 
the United States," and the resolution specifically 
directed inquiry concerning "infiltration by persons who 
are or may be under the control of foreign govern-
ments. . . :" Ibid. See also S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 
2d Sess. Pursuant to that mandate the Subcommittee 
be ·an an in uir into the activities of res ondent herem, 
the United Statz: erv1ce.:.,ne!Ls und, .Inc. SSF). 
DSSF describes Ttself as a nonprofit membership cor-
poration supported by contributions.1 Its stated pur-
pose is "to further the welfare of persons who have 
served or are presently serving in the military." To 
accomplish its declared purpose USSF has engaged in 
various activities 2 directed at United States servicemen. 
It established "coffeehouses" near domestic military in-
stallations, and aided thelJublication of "underground" 
newspapers for distribution on American military instal-
lations throughout the world. The coffeehouses were 
meeting places for servicemen, and ti1e newspapers were 
specialized publications which USSF daims dealt with 
issues of concern to servicemen. Through these opera- J 
tions USSF attempted to communicate to servicemen 
its philosophy and attitudes concerning United States 
involvement in South East Asia. USSF claims the 
coffeehouses and newspapers "became the focus of dis-
sent and expressions of opposition within thP military 
toward the war in Southeast Asia." 3 
In the course of its investigation of USSF, the Sub-
committee concluded that a prima facie showing had 
been made of the need for further investigation, and it 
resolved that appropriate subpoenas, including subpoenas 
1 USSF is, or ha<~ been, listed with the Internal Revenue Service 
a~ a tax exempt charitable organization. 
2 According to the complaint fih>d in th1s action USSF has helped 
provide c1vilian legal defense for military personnel, and books, 
newspapers and library material on request. App., at 11. 
2 App., at ll. 
13-19'23-0PINION 
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(luces tec·um could be issued. Petitioner Eastland, a 
United States Senator, is, as he was then, Chairma,n of 
the Subcommittee. On Ma~970, pursuant to the 
-;:-------' 
above authority, he signed a subpoena dUcces tecum, 
issued on behalf of the SUbcommittee, to the bank where 
USSF has an account. The subpoena comm~ed the 
bank to produce on June 4, 1970, ---
uany and all records appertaining to or involving 
the account or accounts of [USSF]. Such records 
to comprehend papers, correspondence. statements. 
checks, deposit slips and supporting documentation, 
or microfilm thereof within [the bank's] control or 
custody or within [its] means to produce/' 
From the record it appears the subpoena was never 
actually served on the bank.4 In any event, before the I 
June 4, 1970, return d'a.te, USSF and· two of i'ts members· 
b~Iit this a.ctl.on to eiljoin implen:)entation of the sufJ-
poena duces tecum. 
Tfie, complaint named' as defendants Chairman East-
land·, eight other Senators, the Chief Counsel to the 
Subcommittee, ancf the bank.5 The complaint charged 
that the· authorizing resolutions and the Subcommittee's 
actions implementing them were an unconstitutional 
4·Tht> subpoena at is,;ue here directed "Any U. S. MarHhal" io 
serve and return, but there is no proofofservice ·in the record. The· 
·Subcommittee had . issued two previons subpoenas duces tec'l,lm to 
the bank, but they had been withdrawn because of procedural' prob• 
!em:-;. Apparently, at least one of thm;e subpormas actually was 
. served on the bank. App ., at 13. The other subpoena also may 
have bee11 served bec..<tuse the bank informed respondents of its exist-
('UCe. App., at 14. Respondf'nts claim all three subpoenas are ~:;ub~ .. 
stantiall.v identical. 
5 Apparently, at least partially becmtde the bank wat; rwver ::;ervedl 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 22; 46, it has not particijlated ~ in the ·action. Tr .. 
of Oral Arg. 15, Hl-~20, 22.:.23. Tht>refore, as the case reaches us · 
. onJ;y the: Sepators a.nd the. Chief Counsell are .· active . p.articip.antls~'· 
73- 1923-0PI ·ro~ 
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abuse of the legislative power of inquiry, that the ''sole 
purpose" of the Subcommittee investigation was to force 
"public disclosure of beliefs, opinions, expressions au<l 
associations of private citizens which may be unorthodox 
or uupopular." and that the "sole purpose:'" of the sub-
poena was to "harass, chill, punish and deter [USSF 
and its membersl in their exercise of their rights and 
duties under the First Amendment and particularly to 
stifle the freedorn of the press and association guaran-
teed by that Ameudmellt.n The subpoena was issued to 
the bank rather than to USSF and its members, the 
complaint claimed, "in order to deprive [them] of their 
right to protect their private records, such as the sources 
of their contributions, as they would be entitled to do 
if the subpoena had been issued against them directly." 
The complaint further claimed that financial support to 
USSF is obtained exclusively through contributions from 
private individuals, and if the bank records are dis-
closed "much of that financial support will be with-
drawn, and USSF will be unable to continue its consti-
tutionally protected activities. 7 
For relief USSF and its members, the respondents, 
sought a permanent injunction restraining the mem-
bers of the Subcommittee and its Chief Counsel from 
trying to enforce the subpoena by contempt of Congress 
or other means and restraming the bank from comply-
ing with the subpoena.s Respondents also sought a 
declaratory judgment declaring the subpoena and the 
Senate resolutions void under the Constitution. No 
damage claim was made. 
Since the return date on the subpoena was June 4, 
1970, three days after the action was begun, enforcement 
6 App ., at 16. 
7 1\pp., at 17-18. 
8 App., at 1& 
of the .s.ub~1a .!£S~f;&illl 9 m order to avoid mootness 
and to pr~vent possible ·irreparable injury. The District 
Court then held hearings and took testimony on the 
matter. That court ultimately held 10 that respondents 
had not made a sufficient showing of irreparable injury 
to warrant an injunction. The court also purported to 
strike a balance between the legislative interest and re-
spondents' asserted First Amendment rights, NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). It concluded that a 
valid legislative purpose existed for the inquiry because 
Congress was pursuing its functions, under Art. I, § 8, 
of raising and supporting an army, and had a legitimate 
in ter·est in "scru tiniz [ ing] closely possible infiltration 
of subversive elements into an organization which di-
rectly affects the armed forces of this country." 11 Rely-
9 On J nne 1, 1 he District Court refused to enter a temporary re-
straining order, but on .June 4 the Court of \ppeals stayed enforce-
ment of the subpoena pending expedited considPration of the matter 
by the District Court. Thl Court of Appeals reasoned that the-
threat of irreparabl€' injury 1f the subpoena was honored, and the 
significance of the is~>U€'s involved, necessitated "the kind of consid-
emticn and deliberatiOn that would be provided by . . a hearing on 
an application for an injunction." App., at 22. One judge-
dissented. 
10 After the Court of Appeals stayed enforcement of the ~ubpuena 
the D1strict Comt lwld au expedited hearing on respondPnt~' motion 
for a preliminary mjnnction a:td petitioners' motion to dismi~tS 
AftPrward:,; the Distriet Court demed both motions; howrver, the 
Court of Appeals agam stayed enforcement of the subporna 1Jendin~~: 
further order. At that timP the Court of Appeals ordered the-
DJ::;trict Court to proceed to final judgment on the merits, with a 
view to consolidatmg any appeal from that JUdgment with the ap 
peal on rhr denial of a preliminary mjunction. The D1strict Court 
thPll took trr;timony 011 the mPrit~ and, finally, denied respondt•ntsr 
motion for a permanent injunction of the subpoena. Appeal from 
that demsion apparpntly wu~ consolidated w1th the· awpeal from thcr 
afenial of the prl'liminary injunC'tion. 
Jl App, at 31. 
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ing on Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) , 
the District Court concluded that the legislative interest 
must prevail over respvndents' asserted rights; it denied 
respondents' motions for preliminary and permanent in-
junctions. It also dismissed as to the defendant Sena-
tors after conclud-ing that the Speech or Debate Clause 
immunizes them from suit. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 
387 U. S. 82 (1967). 
The Cour:_ of ~Is _reversesJ.. holding first that, 
althougii'COurts should hesitate to interfere with con-
gressional actions even where First Amendment rights 
clearly are implicated, such restraint could not preclude 
judicial review where no alternative avenue of relief is 
available other than "through the equitable powers of 
the court." 488 F. 2d, at 1259. Here the subpoena was 
directed to a third party who could not be expected to 
refuse compliance; unless respondents could obtain judi-
cial relief the bank might comply, the case would become 
moot, and the asserted violation of respondents' consti-
tutioual rights would be irreparable. Because the sub-
poeua was not directed to respondents, the Court of 
Appeals noted, the traditional route for raising their 
defenses by refusing compliance and testing the legal 
issues in a contempt proceeding was not available to 
them. Ansara v. Eastland, -- U. S. App. D. C' -, 
442 F . 2d 751 (1971) . 
Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that if the I 
subpoena was obeyed respondents' First Amendment 
rights would be violated. The court said: 
"'The right of voluutary associations, especially 
those engaged in activities which may not meet with 
popular favor, to be free from having either state or 
federfll officials expose their affiliation and member-
ship absent a compelling state or federal purpose has 
been made clear a nmnber of times. See NAACP v. 
78-192~~-0PINIOR 
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Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; Bates v. Little Roclc, 361 
U. S. 516; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v, NAACP, 
366 U. S. 293 ( 1962); Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Committee, 372 U. S. 539 ( 1962); Pollard v. Roberts, 
393 U. S. 14 ( 1968). affirming the judgment of the 
three-judge district court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas, 283 F. Supp. 248 ( 1968) ." 488 F. 2d, at 
1264. 
In this case that right would be violated, the Court of 
Appeals held. because discovery of the identities of 
donors was the admitted goal of the subpoena, 488 F. 2d, 
at 1267, and that infonnation could be gained as easily 
from bank records as from membership lists. Moreover, 
. if donors' identities we~·e revealed, or if donors reasonably 
feared that result, USSF's contributions would decrease 
substantially, as had already occurred merely because of 
the threat posed by the subpoena.12 
The Court of Appeals then fashioned a remedy to 
deal with the supposed violation of rights. It ordered 
the District Court to "consider the extent to which com-
mittee counsel should properly be requir~d to give evi-
dence as to matters without the legislative sphere." 488 
F. 2d, at 127'0.1 " It also ordered that the court should 
u It appears that the District Court finding of failure to show 
irreparable injury was held clearly erroneous. 488 F. 2d, at 1267. 
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52 (a). 
1 a Hespondents had made a motion in the District Court to com-
pel petitioner Sourwine, thE' subcommittee counsE'l, lo give testunony. 
The Senate passed a resolution, S. Res. 478, October 14, 1970, 
authorizing Sourwine to testify only fi.R to matter~ of public record 
Respondents moved to compd further testimony from Sourwine, but 
the District Court denied the motion. The court ruled Sm1rwme's 
information "ha~> been received by him pursuant to his official duties 
as a staff employee of the Senate .. [a]s such thr information is 
within the privilege of the Senate ... Senate Rule 301, Senate Man-
ual, Senate Document No. 1 of the DOth Congress, F£rst Session." 
App., at, 38. The court abo ruled. that the Senate marle a t1mely 
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"be liberal in granting the right of amendment" to re· 
spondents to add other parties if thereby "the case can 
better proceed to a decisiou on the validity of the sub-
poena." Ibid. Members of Congress could be added as 
parties, the Court of Appeals said, if their presence is 
"unavoidable if a valid order is to be entered by the 
court to vindicate rights which would otherwise go un-
redressed." Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded that 
declaratory relief against Members is "preferable" to 
"any coercive order." Ibid. The clear implication is 
that the District Court was authorized to enter a "coer-
cive order" which in context could mean that the Sub .. 
committee could be prevented from pursuing its inquiry 
by use of a subpoena to the bank. 
One judge dissented on the ground that the member-
ship list cases were distinguishable because in none of 
them was there a "showing that the lists were requested 
for a proper purpose." 1188 F. 2d, l'tt 1277. Here, on 
the other hand, the dissenting judge concluded, "there 
is a demonstrable relationship between the information 
sought and the valid legislative interest of the federal 
Congress" in discovering whether any money for USSF 
activities 11came from foreign sources or subversive orga-
nizations," 488 F. 2d. at 1277--1278, whether 1JSSF ac-
tivities may have constituted violations of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2387 (a) which prohibits interference with the loyalty, 
discipline or morale of the armed services, or whether the 
anonymity of USSF donors might have disguised persons 
who had not complied with the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act, 22 U. S. C. § 611 et .seq. Finally. he noted that 
the prime purpose of the Subcommittee's inquiry was to 
and appropriate invocation of its privilege. Thus information held 
by Sourwine was not discoverable. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b) ( 1). 
Respondents' appeal from this ruling was heard by the Court of Ap-
peals with their appeals from the denial of injunctive relief. 488 F. 
2d, at 1258. 
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investigate application of the Internal Security Act, 50 
U. S. C. § 781 et seq., and that too provided a legitimate 
congressional interest. 
The dissenting judge then balanced the congressional 
interests against private rights, Barenblatt v. United 
States, supra; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 
198, and struck the balance in favor of the investigative 
role of Congress. He reasoned that there is no right to 
secrecy which can frustrate a legitimate congressional 
inquiry into an area where legislation may be had. 488 
F. 2d, at 1278-1279, 1282. Absent a showing that the 
information sought could not be used in the legisla-
tive sphe~e, he concluded, judicial il1terference was 
unwarranted. 
We conclude the actions of the Senate Subcommittee, 
the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel are pro-
tected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitu-
tion , Art. I , § 6, GL 1, and are therewre immune from 
judicial interfe~ence. We reverse. 
II 
The question 14 to be resolved 1s whether the actions 
of the petitioners fall within the "sphere of legisla-
tive activity." If they do, the petitioners "shall not be 
questioned in any other place" about those activities 
since the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause 
are absolute, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 312-313; 
14 The Court of Appeals correctly held that the District Court 
properly entertained this action initially. As the Court of Appeals 
indicated, 488 F. 2d 1259--1260, there is a s.ignificant difference be-
tween a subpoena that seeks information directly from a party 
and one that sreks the same information from a third person. In 
the former ea,;e, of eourse, the party can re.:;ist and thereby tPst the 
.,;ubpoena In the latter ca,;e, however, unless a court may inquire 
to determine whether a legitimate legislative purpo8e is present the 
third person may comply and render irnpossiblr all ;1t1dicial inquiry. 
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United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516 (1972); 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 623 n. 14 (1972); 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 502-503 (1969); 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 84-85 (1967); 
United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 184-185 (1966); 
Barr v. Mateo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959). Without ex-
ception, our cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause 
broadly to effectuate its purpo~es. Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881); United States v. Johnson,, 
383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966); Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U. S. 486, 502-503 (1969); United States v. Brewster, 408 
U. S. 501, 508-509 (1972); Gravel v. United States, 408 
U. S. 606, 617-618 (1972); cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 
U. S. 367, 376-378 (1951). The purpose of the Clause 
is to insure that the legislative function the Constitution 
allocates to Congress may be performed independently. 
"The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause 
were not written into the Con,>titution simply for 
the personal or private benefit of Members of 
Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legis-
lative process by insuring the independence of indi-
vidual legislators." United States v. Brewster, 408 
U. S. 501, 507 (1971). 
In our system "the clause serves the additional function 
of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately 
established by the Founders." United States v. John-
son, 383 U. S., at 178. 
The Clause is a product of the English experience. 
Kilb01.trn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881); United 
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177-179 (1966). Due 
to that heritage our cases make it clear that the "central 
role" of the Clause is to "prevent intimidatiOn of legis-
lators by the Executive a.nd accountability before a 
possible hostile judiciary, Unded States v. Johnson, ~~83 
U. S. 159, 181 (1966)," Gravel v. United Btates, supmft 
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EASTLAND v. UNITED STATES SERVICEMEN'S FUND l1 
at 617. That role is not the sole function of the Clause. 
however, and English history does not totally define the 
reach of the Clause. Rather, it "must be interpreted 
in light of the American experience, and in the context 
of the American constitutional scheme of govern-
ment .... " United States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U. S. 
508. Thus we have long held that when it applies the 
Clause provides protection against civil as well as CI·imi-
nal actions, and against actions brought by private indi~ 
viduals as well as those initiated by the Executive 
Branch. Kilbourn v. ' Thompson, supra; Tenney v. 
Brandhove, supra; Doe v. McMillan, supra; Dombrow-
ski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967). 
The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions I 
is supported by the absoluteness of the terms "shall not 
be questioned," and the sweep of the terms "in any other 
place." In reading the Clause broadly we have said that 
legislators acting within the sphere of legitimate legisla-
tive activity "should be protected not only from the con-
sequences of litigation's results but also from the burden 
of defending themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland, 
supra, 387 U. S., at 85. Just as a criminal prosecution 
infringes upon the independeuce which the Clause is 
designed to preserve, a private civil action, whether for 
an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces 
Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from 
their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Private 
civil actions also may be used to delay and disrupt 
the legislative function. Moreover, whether a criminal 
action is instituted by the Executive Branch, or a civil 
action is brought by private parties, judw1al power is 
still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legis-
lative independence is imperiled. We reaffirm that once 
it is determined that Members are acting within the 
"legitimate legislative sphere" the Speech or Debate 
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Clause is an absolute bar to interference. Doe v. Mc-
Millan, supra, 402 U. S., at 314. 
III 
In determini1:g whether particular activities other 
than literal speech or debate fall within the "legitimate 
legislative sphere" we look to see whether the activities 
are "done in a session of the House by one of its mem-
bers in relation to the business before it." Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, supra, 103 U. S., at 204. More specifically, 
we must determine whether the activities are 
"an integral part of the deliberative and communi-
cative processes by which Members partiCJpate in 
committee and House proceedings with respect to 
the consideration and passage or rejection of pro-
posed legislation or with respect to other matters 
which the Constitution places within the jurisdic-
tion of either House." Gravel v. United States, 408 
u. s. 606, 625 (1972). 
See Doe v. McMillan, supra, 412 U. S., at 313. 
The power to investigate &-nd to do so through com-
pulsory process plainly falls within that definition. This 
Court has often noted that the power to investigate is 
inherent in the power to make law because " [a] legisla-
tive body cannot legislate ~visely or effectively m the 
absence of information re~:opecting the conditions which 
the legislation is intended to affer.t or change." McGrain 
v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 125 175 ( 1927). See Anderson 
v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1811). United States v. Rum-
ley, 345 U. S. 41, 46 (Hl52).15 Issuance of subpoenas 
1 ~ Although the power to inve::;tigatc is nE'ccs::;arily broad it JS not 
unlimited. It::; boundan<•s arE' ddhwd by its source. Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957). Thus, "the scope of tlw 
power of inquiry is as penetr::~tmg and far-rc>acbing as the potcntwl 
power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution." Ba1·rn-
73-1923--0PINION 
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such as the one in question here has long been held to 
be a legitimate use by Congress of its power to investi .. 
gate. Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 188. 
"[W] here the legislative body does not itself possess 
the requisite information--which not infrequently 
is true-recourse must be had to others who do 
possess it. Experience has taught that mere re-
quests for such information often are unavailing, 
and also that information which is volunteered is 
not always a.ccurate or GOmplete; so some means 
of compulsion are essential to obtain what is 
needed." McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U. S., 
at 175. 
It also has been held that the subpoena power may be 
exercised by a committee acting, as here, on behalf of 
one of the Houses. !d., 273 U. S., at 158. Cf. Tenney 
v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). Without 
such power the subcommittee may not be able to do the 
task assigned to it by Congress. To conclude that the 
power of inquiry is other than an integral part of the 
legislative process would be a miserly reading of the 
Speech or Debate Clause in derogation of the "integrity 
of the legislative process." United States v. Brewster, 
408 U. S. 501, 545-546 (1971); and United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 172 (1966). 
We have already held that the "aet of authorizing an 
investigation pursuant to which . . . materials were 
gathered" is an integral part of the legislative process. 
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 313 (1973). The rou-
tine implementation of the subpoena power pursuant to 
blatt v. Umted States, 360 U. S. 109, 111 (1959), Sinclair· v. United 
States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-292 (1929). WP have made it clear, how-
ever, that Congress is not invested with a "general power to inquire 
into private affair;:;." McGrain v. Daugherty, 27;3 U . S., at 17a. 
The subject of any inquiry always must be one "on which legislat ion 
':ould be had." ld., at 177. 
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an authorized investiga.t10n is similarly an indispensable 
ingredient of lawmaking; without it our recognition that 
the "act of authorizing" is protected would be meaning~ 
less. To hold that Members of Congress are protected 
for authorizing an investigation, but not for implement~ 
ing that authorization through the subpoena power, 
would be a contradiction denigrating the power granted 
to Congress in Art. I and would "indirectly impair the 
delibrations of Congress." Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 
625. 
The particular investigation at issue here is related to \ 
and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. 
Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 P. S., at 187. On 
this record the pleadings show that the actions of the 
Members and the Chief Counsel fall within the "sphere 
of legitimate legislative activity." The Subcommittee 
was acting under an unambiguous resolution from the 
Senate authorizing it to make a complete study of the 
"administration, operation, and enforcement of the In-
ternal Security Act of 1950 .... " S. Res. 341, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 3419 (January 30, 1970). That 
grant of authority is sufficient to show that the investi-
gation upon which the Subcommittee had embarked 
concerned a subject on which "legislation could be had." 
McGrain v. Dauoherty, 273 U. S., at 177; see Communist 
Party v Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 
1 (1961). 
The propriety of making USSF a subject of the investi~ 
gation and subpoena is a subject on which the scope of 
our inquiry is narrow. Hutcheson v. United States, 369 
U. S., at 618-619. See Sinclair v. United States, 270 
U. S. '263, 294-295 (1929). "The courts should not go 
bey<)lld the narrow confines of determining that a com~· 
mittce's inquiry may fairly be deemed \vithm its prov~ 
ince." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra1 341 U. S., at 378 
I 
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(1950). Cf. Doe v. McMillan, supra, 412 U.S. 315 n. 10. 
Even the most cursory look at the facts presented by the 
pleadings reveals the legitimacy of the USSF subpoena. 
Inquiry into the sources of funds used to carry on activ-
ities su~pected by a Subcommittee of Con~s to hav~iJ, 
potentiaiTor underminin the morale of the armed forces 
is wit in t e eg1 ·1mate ~-~lativ§. ~~re. "'~'1I1cteed, the 
c'Ornplan"i't'"'Tie'feteliSi'i'S1hatUSSF operated on or near 
military and naval bases, and that its facilities became 
the "focus of dissent" to declared national policy. 
Whether USSF activities violated any statute is not rele-
vant; the inquiry was intended to inform Congress in an 
area where legislation may be had. USSF asserted it 
does not know the sources of its funds; in light of the 
Senate authorization to the Subcommittee to investigate 
"infiltration by persons who are or may be under the 
control of foreign governments," supra, at 1, and in 
view of the pleaded facts, it is clear that the subpoena 
to discover USSF's bank records "may fairly be deemed 
within [the Subcommittee's] province." Tenney v. 
Brandhove, supra. 
We conclude that th<> Speech or Debate Clause pro-
vides complete immunity for the Members for the issu-
ance and implementation of this subpoena. We draw no 
rtistinction between the Membe and the Chief CounseL 
In rrave , supra, we made it clear that "the day-to-day 
work of such aides is so critical to the Members' perform-
ance that they must be treated as [the Members'] alter 
egos .... " ld., at 616-617. See 408 U.S., at 621. Here 
the Chief Counsel has been charged in the complaint only 
with implementing thE' subpoena in the same fashio11 as 
the Senators. Contrast Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 
U. S., at 84. Since tho Members are immune because· 
implementation of the subpoena is "essential to legislat·· 
ing1' their a1de shares that immunity.. Gravel v. United' 
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States, 408 U. S., at 621; Doe v. McMillan, supra, 412 
U. S., at 317. 
IV 
Respondents rely on language m Gravel v. United 
States, supra, 408 U.S., at 621. 
"[N] o prior case has held that Members of Con-
gress would be immune if they executed an invalid 
resolution by themselves carrying out an illegal 
arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a 
hearing, themselves seized property or invaded the 
privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides 
should be immune from liability or questioning in 
such circumstances." 
From this respondents argue that the subpoena works 
an invasion of their privacy, and thus cannot be immune 
from judicial questioning. The conclusion is unwar-
ranted. The quoted language from Gravel referred to 
actions which were not "essential to legislating." 408 
U. S., at 621. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 
169 (1966) . For example, the arrest by the Sergeant-At-
Arms was held unprotected in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 
supra, because it was not "essential to legislating." See 
Mar~:Jhall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 537 (1917). Quite 
the contrary is the case with a routine subpoena intended 
to gather information about a subject on which legisla·-
tion may be had. See Quinn v. Un'ited States, 349 U.S. 
155, 161 (1955). 
Respondents also contend that the subpoena eannot 
be protected by the speech or debate immunity because 
the "sole purpose" of the investigation is to "foree public 
(hsclosure of beliefs, opinions, expressions and associa-
tions of private citizens which may be unorthodox or un-
popular." App., at 16. Hespondents view the scope of 
the privilege too narrowly. Our cases make clear that 
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in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we 
do not look to the motives alleged to have prompted it. 
Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 200 (1957); 
Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U. S. 599, 614 (1961). 
In Brewster, supra, we said "the Speech or Debate Clause 
protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regu-
lar course of the legislative process and into the motive 
for those acts." Id., at 525 (emphasis added). And in 
Tenney v. Brandhove we said that, "[t]he claim of an 
unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege." 341 
U. S., at 377. If the mere allegation that a valid legis-
lative act was undertaken for an unworthy purpose would 
lift the protection of the Clause then the Clause simply 
would not provide the protection historically undergird-
ing it. "In times of political passion, dishonest or vin-
dictive motives are readily attributed to legislative con-
duct and as readily believed." Tenney v. Brandhove, 
supra, 341 U. S., at 379. The wisdom of congressional 
approach or methodology is not open to judicial veto. 
Doe v. McMillan, supra, at 313. Nor is the legitimacy 
of a congressional inquiry to be defined by what it pro-· 
duces. The very nature of the investigative function-
like any research-is that it takes the searchers up some 
"blind alleys" and into nonproductive enterprises. To 
be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable 
end result. 
Finally, respondents argue that the purpose of the sub-
poena was to "harass, chill, punish and deter them" in 
the exercise of their First Amendment rights, App., at 16, 
and thus that the subpoena cannot be protected by the 
Clause. Their theory seems to be that once it is alleged 
that First Amendment rights may be infringed by con-
gressional action the judiciary may intervene to protect 
those rights; the Court of Appeals seems to have sub-
scribed to that theory. That approach, however, ignores 
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the absolute nature of the speech or debate protection 1'6 
and our cases which have broadly construed that 
protection. 
"Congressmen and their aides are immune from 
liability for their actions within the 'legislative 
16 In some situations we have balanced First Amendment rights 
against public interests, Watkins v. United States, 345 U. S .. 178 
(1957); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), but those 
cases did not involve attempts by private parties to impede congres-
sional action where the Sperch or Debate Clause was raised by 
Congress by way of defense. Cf. United States v. Rttmely, 345 
U. S. 41, 46 (1953). The cases were criminal prosecutions where 
defendants sought to justify their refusals to answer congressional 
inquiries by asserting their Firflt Amendment rights. Different prob-
lems were presented then here. Any interference with congres-
sional action had already occurred when the cases reached us, and 
Congress was seeking the aid of the judiciary to enforce its will. 
Our task was to perform the judicial function in criminal prosecu-
tions, and we properly scrutinized the predicates at the criminal 
prosecutions. Watkins, supra, 354 U. S., at 208; Flaxer- v. United 
States, 358 U. S. 147, 151 (1959); Quinn v. United States, 349 
U.S. 155, 162, 169 (1955); In re 1/utcheson, 369 U.S. 599, 630-631 
(Warren, C. J., dissenting); 640 (DouGLAS, J., dissenting). As Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter said conemring in Watkin.~: 
"By ... making the federal judiciary the affirmative agency for, 
enforcing the authority that underlies the congressional power to 
pumsh for contempt, Ccngrr~s necessarily brings into play the spe-
cific provisions of the Constitution relating to the prosecution of 
offenses and those implied restrictions under which courts function ." 
Watkins v. Umted States, 854 U. S. 178, 216 (Frankfurter, .J., 
concurring). 
Where we are presented with an attempt to interfere with an on-
gomg activity by Congress, and that act is found to be within the 
legitimate legislative sphcn· , balancing play:J no part. The Speech 
or Debate protection provides an absolute immunity from judicial 
interference. Collateral harm which may occur in the course of a 
legitimate legislative inquiry does not allow us to force th0 inquiry 
to "grind to a halt." Hutcheson v. United States, 809 U. S .. 599, 618 
(1962) , 
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sphere,' Gravel v. Um'ted States, supra, at 624-625, 
even though their conduct, if performed in other 
than legislative contexts would in itself be uncon-
stitutional or otherw1se contrary to criminal or civil 
statutes." Doe v. McMillan, supra, at 312-313. 
For us to read the Clause a~ respondents suggest would 
create an exception not warranted by the language, pur-
poses or history of the Clause. Respondents make the 
familiar argument that the broad protection granted by 
the Clause creates a potential for abuse. That is cor-
rect, and in Brewster, supra, we noted that the risk of 
such abuse was "the conscious choice of the Framers 
buttressed and justified by history." 408 U. S., at 516. 
Our consistently broad construction of the Speech or 
Debate Clause rests on the belief that it must be so 
construed to provide the independence which is its cen-
tral purpose. 
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial 
interfer-ence may cause. A legislative inquiry has been 
frustrated for nearly five years during which the Mem-
bers and their aide have beeu obliged to employ counsel 
and have been distracted from the purpose of their 
inquiry. The Clause exists to prevent precisely this 
type of "questioning" and the enlistment of judicial 
power to chall-enge the wisdom of Congress' use of its 
authority. 
v 
Wh<'n this case wa!" in the Court of Appeals 1t was 
consolidated with three other cases 17 because it was 
assumed that "a decision in [this] case might well con-
17 Progressive Labor Party. et al. v House Internal Security 
f'ommittee . et al. (C. A. No. 71-1609) · National Peace Act!,m 
Coalition, et al. v. House Internal Security Committee , et al . (C'. A. 
No . 71 ·2034); PPoples Currlitwn for PeMe and Justtce v. Hoti)Je 
Jnterual Security Comnuttee, et al (C. A No 71-1717) . 
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trol the disposition of [them]." Those cases involve 
subpoeuas from the House Internal Security Committee 
to banks for the bank records of certain organizations. 
As here, the organizations whose bank records were 
sought sued alleging that if the subpoenas were honored 
their constitutional rights would be violated. The issue l 
of speech or debate protection for Members and aides 
is presented in all the cases. However, the complaints I 
in the House cases are different from the complaint here, 
additional parties are involved, and consequently addi-
tional issues may be presented. 
Progress in those cases was suspended when they were 
in the pleading sta.ge awaiting the outcome of this case. 
The issues in them, therefore, have not been joined. 
Additionally, it appears that the Session in which the 
House subpoenas were issued has expired. Since the 
House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuing body, 
McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U. S. 135, 181; 
Gojack v. United States, 384 U. S. 702, 717 n. 4 (1967), 
the question of mootness question may be raised. More-
over it appears that the committee that issued the sub-
poenas has been abolished by the House, H. Res. 5, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess., January 14, 1975. In view of these 
problems, and because those cases were not briefed or 
argued here, we feel it would b€ unwise to attempt to 
decide any issues they might present that are not pre-
sented in the instant case. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U. S. 486, 496 JJ. 8, 550 (S'rEWAR'l', J., dissenting). 
Judgment in the Senate case is reversed and the case 
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for entry of a judg-
ment directing the District Court to dismiss tho com-
plaint. The House cases are remanded with directions 
to remand to the District Court for further consideration 
consistent with this opinion. 
.Reversed and remanded. 
~uvremt <!Jourt af tlrt 2ftttitt!t ~tates 
~1H1~htgh1n, ]fl. <!J. 20.?J~2 
CHAMSERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 22, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1923 - Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's 
Fund 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincere ly, 
~~~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
v 
-.§upuuu <!Jonrl of tirt 'J'tnifrb .:§tn.h'.s 
't'rnol(ittgfrrrr, p. <!J. :w&rn·.;1 
CHAMOERS OF 
,JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 25 , 1975 
Re: No. 73-19~3 -Eastland v. u. S. Servicemen ' s Fund -· ------- ·--· -- ·---~·-- ·-·-·--
Dear Chief : 
Please join me . 
The Chief Justice 





~ttttt Qfcurl of tir~ ~ttiftb- ~fa.ttg 
~MltittgtMt. ~. Qf. 20pJl..;t 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
April 25, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1923 - Eastland v. United States 
Servicemen's Fund 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
--
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-
$5t.qrrmt2 Qfottrt of t~t~nitt?t .§tate.s 
'2Jl'a!iiyiltgion, ~. (If. 20c?J1;1 
April 28, 1975 
73-1923 - Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund 
Dear Thurgood, 
I should appreciate your adding my name 
to your concurring opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
-
.§u:pr l'l!U ('J o nrl of fir t 'Jfutittb ~taft g 
'JilT cur !yittgton, ~. <!f. 20 c? J! ~ 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
May 2, 1975 
RE: No. 73-1923 Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund 
Dear Thurgood: 




Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!!IERS OF" 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
_jn:.prttttt <!Jottrl of tlrt ~b .jhtftg 
~aslfinghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll&i'!~ 
May 6, 1 975 
/ 
Re: 73-1923- Eastland v. U. S. Servicemen's Fund 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Henry Putzel suggested to me that because 
the House and Senate cases are consolidated under one 
number in this Court some language clarifying the 
disposition should be added. I have made some changes 
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liability for their actions within the 'legislative 
sphere,' Gravel v. United States, supra, at 624-625, 
even though their conduct, if performed in other 
than legislative contexts would in itself be uncon-
stitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil 
statutes." Doe v. McMillan, supra, Ct.t 312-313. 
For us to read the Clause as respondents suggest would 
create an exception not warranted by the language, pur-
poses or history of the Clause. Respondents make the 
familiar argument that the broad protection granted by 
the Clause creates a potential for abuse. That is cor-
rect, and in Brewster, supra; ·we ·noted that the risk of 
such abuse was "the conscious choice Qf the Framers 
buttressed and justified by history." 408 U. S., at 516. 
Our consistently broad construction of the Speech ~ or 
Debate Clause rests on the belief that it must be so 
construed to provide the independence which is its cen-
tral purpose. 
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial 
interference may cause. A legislative inquiry has been 
frustrated for nearly five years during which the Mem-
bers and their aide have been obliged to devote time to 
consultation with their counsel concerning the litiga-
tion, and have been distracted from the purpose of their -
inquiry. The Cluuse was written to prevent -the -need -
to be confronted by such "questioning" and to forbid 
invocation of judicial power to challenge the wisdom of 
Congress' use of its investigative authority. 
v 
Whe~ case was in the Court of Appeals it was 
consolidated with three other cases 17 because it was 
17 Progressive Labor Party, et al. v. House Internal Security 
Committee, et al. (C, A. No. 7l-H109) ; National Peace Action 
Coalition, {lt al. v. House Internal Security Committee, et . al. (C. A~ 
73-1923-0P!NION 
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~----=--------------· the Senate assumed that "a decision in rEi! case might well con~ 
trol the disposition of ~-" _Those cases involve 
subpoenas from the Holise Internal Security Committee 
the others....., 
in · the Senate to banks for the bank records of certain organizations. 
aspect of this case As §i), the organizations whose bank records were 
sought sued alleging that if the subpoenas were honored 
their constitutional rights would be violated. The issue 
of speech or debate protection for Members and aides 
is presented in all the cases. However, the complaints . 
the Senate 
case in the House cases are different from the complaint ~1.n 
additional parties are involved, and consequently addi-
the House tional issues may be presented. -
Progress in~ cases was suspended when the-y were 
in the pleading .stage:awaiting the outcome_of,this case. 
The issues -in them, therefore, ha.ve not been joined. 
Additionally, it appears that the Session in which the 
House subpoenas were issued has expired. Since the 
House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuing body, 
McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U. S. 135, 181; 
Gojack v. United States, 384 U. S. 702, 717 n. 4 (1967), 
a ""'-+fte question of mootness ~ussti~ay be raised. 1\1ore-
over it appears that the committee that issuedcihe sub-
the House aspect -- poenas has been abolished by the House, H. Res. 5, 94th 
of this -=..cas -- Cong., -1st Sess., January 14, 1975~ - In view- of these -
Senate aspe 
of this 
ose case - were not briefed or 
argued here, we feel it wou e unwise to attempt to 
decide any issues they might present that are not pre-
sented in the nstant case. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U. . 86, n. 8, 559 (STEWART J 
Judgmen m e enat case is reversed and the case 
is remanded to the Court of Appea s or entry o a JU g-
ment directing the District Court to dismiss the com., 
No. 71-2034) ; Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice v. Ho-us~ 
/'l!ternal Security Committee,. et al. (C. A. No. 71-1717). 
the Benate -,_ _ 
aspect of~ 
with respect tc 
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plaint. The House~ are remanded with directions 
to remand to the District Court for further consideration 
consistent with this opinion, 
Reversed and remanded. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
_itqtrttttt <lfottri of tqt 'J'nitt~ ,jtaftg 
Jfaslfi:nght~ ~. <!f. 2ll.;t~~ 
May 13, 1975 
PERSONAL 
Re: 73-1923 - Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree wholeheartedly with your sentiments and am as 
offended as you at the protracted nature of this litigation but felt a 
Court opinion could not stress this too much without provoking a 
concurrence -- but not like yours. The purposes served by the 
Speech or Debate Clause -- especially when they relate to an ongoing 
legislative function -- clearly require speedy resolution of actions 
like this one. I am not sure, however, whether the respondents 
were entirely responsible for the delay. Petitioners, who had just 
been "burned" by Powell v. McCormack, it seems to me were in no 
great haste. Several times they C!_greed to extensions of time, and 
after the original expeditious heari;"gs in both the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals everything seemed to settle down and, to my 
knowledge, petitioners did not press for expedited consideration of 
the matter. 
In the opinion I have tried to remedy the delay problem to 
some extent. For example, on page 14 the opinion states: 
11 0n this record the pleadings show that the actions 
of the Members and the Chief Counsel fall within the 
1 sphere of legitimate legislative activity. 1 11 (Emphasis 
added) 
The underlined phrase is for the benefit of the District Judge confronted 
by one of these actions. It is intended to remind District Judges that 
they may dismiss on the pleadings alone when a complaint shows on its 
face that no relief may be granted against those enjoying Speech or 
Debate protection. 
- 2 -
It might be wise for me to add something, making it even 
clearer that expeditious treatment of cases like this one is essential. 
For instance, at the end of the first full paragraph on page 19 I could 
add a footnote to this effect: 
I 
- / 
~ / Although the Speech or Debate Clause has never been 
read so broadly that legislators 11 are absolved from the 
duty of filing a motion to dismiss, 11 Powell v. McCormack, 
supra, 395 U.S. 486, 505 n. 25; see Tenney v. Brandhove, 
341 U.S. 367, 376-77, the purposes which the Clause serves 
require that such motions be given the most expeditious 
treatment by District Courts because one branch of govern-
ment is being asked to halt the functions of a coordinate 
~
- branch. If there is a dismissal and an appeal, Courts of 
Appeals have a duty to see that the litigation is swiftly 
resolved. /\ Delay · d t in this 1' tigation has frustrated 
a valid Congressional inquir/ "' 
For my part, I would see no need to hand even 11 negative 
bouquets 11 to the lawyers for the respondents. I'd give them no brickbats, 
but no brownie points! 
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Please join 
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No. 73-1923 Eastland v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
f. "l, ~ ;r 
>~:(. 
Your letter of May 13, suggests to me that the Senate 
Committee itself bears part of the responsibility for the 
unconscionable delay. 
In view of this, I am inclined to abandon my concurrence 
if a footnote is added along the lines indicated on page 2 
of your letter. I enclose a copy of your proposed footnote, .," 
in which I have added the next to the last sentence. The 
footnote will be strengthened if the reader is reminded that 
the Senate Subcoumittee has been enjoi~ed for half a ... decade. 
The Chief Justice 




Although the Speech or Debate Clause has never been 
read so broadly that legislators "are absolved from the 
duty of filing a motion to dismiss," Powell v. McCormack, 
supra, 395 u.s. 486, SOS n. 25; see Tenney v. Brandhove, 
341 u.s. 367, 376·77, the purposes which the Clause serves 
requires that such motions be given the most expeditious 
treatment by District Courts because one branch of govern-
ment is being asked to half the functions of a coordinate 
branch. If there is a dismissal and an appeal, Courts of 
Appeals have a duty to see that the litigation is swiftly 
resolved. Enforcement of the Subcommittee's subpoena has 
been restrained since June 1970, nearly five years, While 
this litigation dragged through the courts. This protracted 
delay has frustrated a valid Congressional inquiry. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ttprttttt <!Jcnrl xtf t~e 1:mtfth .§tafts 
~asJri:ttgLnt, ~· <!f. 2!Jgfi.!-~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE May 21, 1975 
Re: 73-1923 -Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
A purely stylistic change is being made on page 20 so 
that the final sentence in the first full paragraph will read: 
''In view of these problems, and because the House 
aspects of this case were not briefed or argued here, 
we conclude it would be unwise to attempt to decide 
any issues they might present that are not resolved 
in the Senate aspect of this case. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n. 8, 559 
(STEWART, J., dissenting). 11 
The Headnote 11 lineup 11 prepared by Mr. Putzel reads: 
11 B URGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the 
Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, 
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and 
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed 
a concurring opinion in which BRENNAN and 
STEWART, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a 
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James 0 . Eastland et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
l]nited States Servicemen's 
Fund et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, 
[May -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
The Court holds today, some five years after this liti-
gation was commenced, that the petitioners are immune 
from suit and that the respondents' action-though 
properly entertained-should have been dismissed. Thus, 
on the official records, the respondents lost their case. 
In fact, they won it. 
The subpoena of the Subcommittee was issued on 
May 28, 1970, commanding production of the requested 
records on June 4, 1970. Prior to that date, respondents 
brought this action to enJoin implementation of the 
subpoena duces tecum. The Court's opinion traces the 
tedious history of the resulting litigation, which did not 
reach its denouement in the Court of Appeals until Janu-
ary 23, 1974. We granted certiorari on October 11, 1974; 
the case was argued on January 22, 1974; and-at long 
last-we now direct dismissal of the complaint.. 
During the intervening five years a legitimate inquiry 
of the Senate has been frustrated. Of course, we have 
no occasion today to decide the merits of respondents' 
First Amendment claim. Nor do we know whether the 
activities of respondents, addressed to United States 
servicemen during a time of war, were bemg financed or 
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committee considered this to be a real possibility. If 
it were true, the five-year del~:~-y in resolution of this 
litigation, during which time an injunction for.eclosed 
legislative inqt.~iry, was intolerable. Presumably, during 
this period, resppndents' activities continued unrestrained. 
The long delay may have destroyed whatever efficacy the 
legislative inquiry might once have had in serving the 
public interest. 
I am concerned, not with this case in 1975, but rather 
with the functioning of the judicial system in a way that 
allows a party, whose cause ultimately may be resolved 
against him, to delay decision of a case until the mere 
passage of time achieves the party's ends. The very 
conduct that concerned the Senate Subcommittee was 
allowed to continue for years free of legislative investiga-
tion. As the Court today notes : 
"Private civil actions . .. may be used to delay and 
disrupt the legislative function." Ante, at 11. 
I 8mphasize that these observations are not directed 
at counsel, who were entitled to take advantage of all 
available lawful procedures to further their clients' inter-
ests. And, in noting the success of resourceful counsel 
in exploiting delay under injunctive protection, I am not 
unmindful of the duty of courts to protect the rights 
of citizens. As is well stated in MR. JusTICE MARSHALL's 
concurring opinipn, the Speech or Debate Clause "does 
nat immunize co'ngressional action from judicial review,'' 
and it may be conceded that the issues presented in this 
case merited careful judicial consideration. Indeed this 
is apparent from the decisions of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals. 
My concern is directed solely to protracted delay in 
the judicial process, accompanied by injunctive restraint 
of legislative inquiry into what appeared. to be an 
emergency situation. Although expedited hearings were 
73- 1923-CONCUR (A) 
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sometimes held in the course of the proceedings below, 
the end result reflects little evidence of expedition and 
convincing evidence of successful delaying tactics. In 
such a case, it seems to me that the Federal Judiciary-
and here I include this Court-must find more effective 
means for bringing injunctive litigation to an expeditious 
conclusion. Legitimate concern for protecting the as-
serted rights of citizens must be accompanied by an equal 
concern for not allowing the courts to be used as a 
means-as they apparently were in this case-of shutting 
off legislative inquiry for half a decade. 
(f.) .. 
. 
U) . 
t::l 
